This book traces the historical lineages of Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology from Plato through Augustine and Calvin. It focuses upon this epistemology as a philosophical interpretation of what is generally taken to be a narrow theological doctrine. The author provides a textually based and closely reasoned introduction to the epistemological ideas of Plato, Augustine, Calvin, Plantinga, and several other writers and shows the continuity of a certain approach to the knowledge of God; it may be called the Platonic—Augustinian—Reformed approach.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:542 BOOK REVIEWS sires. Rather, the Subjects need to want to do those things that bring about the Bosses' satisfaction. And this raises the question of the control of the imagination. explores the subtle power relations between controllers and the controlled, to the end of exploring ways that imagination offers control over power relationships. Yet Rorty ends with a bleak vision: we are a basically conservative species, whose capacities (...) for imagining new forms of power relationships tend to be dominated by the archetypes gleaned from our collective and individual experience, often reflecting malign structures. Even benign experiences, Rorty argues, tend to reinforce our inclination to seek refuge in submission to authority. What are we to make of this collection which stretches from philosophy of mind through Freudian analyses to a chastened Hobbesian vision of our social and moral order? There is much here to interest philosophers of mind and those who are concerned with the frontier between that field and empirical psychology. While she does not supply a theory of mind, Rorty shows clearly how much heterogeneous material such a theory must encompass. JOHN CHURCHILL Hendrix College Conway, Arkansas Faith and Reason From Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology. DEWEY J. HOITENGA, JR. S.U.N.Y. Press, 1991. Pp. 263. $18.95. This is an excellent and important book. Most of those who have written about the ' Reformed ' epistemology of religious belief have done so with either polemical or systematic interests in mind. That is not inappropriate, since the interests of those who have propounded Reformed epistemology have also been mainly polemical and systematic. Though here and there they have pointed to historical antecedents, they have not traced those antecedents in any detail. Hoitenga's contribution is to do exactly that. For the most part, his understanding of Reformed epistemology is accurate. He himself crisply summarizes his understanding in these words: "Its central claim is the immediacy of our knowledge of God. We do not, in the first instance, know God by inference or testimony but by direct acquaintance with him. A closely related claim fa that we cannot easily remain indifferent to the God whom we know by such direct acquaintance. Thus our knowledge of God is like our knowl- BOOK REVIEWS 543 edge of every other fundamental kind of reality-physical objects, their properties and relationships, others persons, right and wrong, good and evil, and the elementary objects of logic and mathematics. Furthermore, the claim is that everyone knows God in this way, not just the Christian believer. If someone does not believe in God, that is, does not trust in God as Christians do, this is not because one does not know God. All human beings by nature have what Calvin calls an awareness of divinity.... Although the fall has clouded over this natural awareness of God and led to the loss of faith in him, it has not eradicated this awareness. Christian faith does not alter this direct awareness of God but rather presupposes it, rejuvenates it, and enlarges it " {235). Hoitenga discusses in detail three precursors of this view: Plato, Augustine, and Calvin, thus showing that the contemporary Reformed epistemology of religious belief stands in a long intellectual tradition. Though shortly I will offer a few critical comments about his interpretations, his discussion of the three thinkers is, in each case, extremely helpful. The full view of each of these thinkers, on the matters under consideration, must be constructed from passages scattered around in a large number of different texts. Hoitenga conducts this recovery of the relevant sources and the construction of his interpretation with wide knowledge of the primary texts, with apt use of the secondary literature, and with the judiciousness and balance which such interpretation requires. Though I shall now make critical comments on three points, I view these criticisms as entirely compatible with my judgment that Hoitenga has made a very important contribution with this historical introduction to Reformed epistemology. I begin with one point in his exposition of contemporary Reformed epistemology. Plantinga observes that there are perhaps some cases in which, though a person has a prima facie right to believe some theistic proposition immediately, that right is... (shrink)

Foreword, by S. Ratner.--Freedom and education, by H. M. Kallen.--Dewey's theory of the nature and function of philosophy, by A. E. Murphy.--Dewey's reconstruction of logical theory, by E. Nagel.--Method in aesthetics, by A. C. Barnes.--The religion of shared experience, by J. H. Randall, Jr.--A Deweyesque mosaic, by W. Hamilton.--Pragmatism as a philosophy of law, by E. W. Patterson.--The political philosophy of instrumentalism, by S. Hu.--Creative democracy, the task before us, by J. Dewey.

This article explores the possibility that John Dewey’s silence on the matter of which democratic means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing, makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective. Michael Eldridge relates the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr., and Dewey in which Dewey concedes “that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract from (...) my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters.” Dewey’s concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for realizing his vision of democracy as a way of life. Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not problematic, though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey’s work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas. For then experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions such that specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of political practice. When pressured to operationalize political technology, he chose the appropriately open-ended and, at times, frustratingly vague means of education and growth. In short, Dewey did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or which democratic means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished. (shrink)

Classical American philosophy has both contemporary and historical significance. It provides direct, imaginative, and critical insights into our contemporary global society, its massive and pressing problems, and its possibilities for real improvement. Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy, 2/e, provides the resources necessary to understand and act on these insights. Revised and greatly expanded in this second edition, it offers a comprehensive account of classical American philosophy and pragmatism, presenting the essential writings of all the major figures of the tradition: Charles (...) S. Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, George Santayana, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. It also incorporates illuminating introductory essays by leading scholars in the field, providing biographical and cultural context as well as original critical and interpretive perspectives. This new edition adds several new selections by, and about, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Jane Addams, Borden Parker Bowne, Alain Locke, and John Herman Randall, Jr. These essays situate pragmatism and classical American philosophy in their wider American philosophical contexts of transcendentalism, feminism and writings by American women, personalism and idealism, African-American thought, and naturalism and realism. The volume also includes up-to-date suggestions for further reading that are useful for both beginning and advanced readers. Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy, 2/e, is ideal for courses in American philosophy, pragmatism, American thought and culture, and American intellectual history, and also serves as essential reading for anyone interested in American philosophy. (shrink)

Here, in a single volume, is a comprehensive and definitive account of pragmatism and classical American philosophy. Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy, now revised and expanded in this second edition, presents the essential writings of the major philosophers of this tradition: Charles S. Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, George Santayana, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Illuminating introductory essays, written especially for this volume by distinguished scholars of American philosophy, provide biographical and cultural context as well as original critical (...) and interpretive perspectives. This edition also includes all new selections and interpretive essays that situate pragmatism and classical American philosophy in a wider American philosphical context, including: Ralph Waldo Emerson and transcendentalism; Jane Addams, feminism, and writings of American women; Borden Parker Bowne, personalism, and idealism; Alain Locke and Afro-American thought; and John Herman Randall, Jr., nationalism and realism. Up-to-date suggestions for further reading will benefit both introductory and advanced readers. This American intellectual tradition speaks insightfully, creatively, and critically to our contemporary global society and its pressing problems. In unmatched quality and quantity, Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy provides the resources necessary to understand and act on these insights. (shrink)

Experience and reason, it has been claimed, provide the bases of religious belief. The first and fourth groups of selections in Mr. Yandell’s collection of readings probe this claim. In these sections, as in the two intervening ones primary sources are followed by critical analyses and appraisals. Thus, when religious experience is being considered selections from the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, Buddhist scriptures, and the Old and New Testaments are followed by commentaries drawn from writers such as William James, Rudolf (...) Otto, and John Baillie. Generally, primary materials are selected from "traditional" thinkers, while analyses are drawn from more contemporary ones. For example, the problem of evil is set by Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, and discussed by J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, and Dewey Hoitenga. Those authors who are included are readable, and the readings mesh well. (shrink)

Plato and the trial of Socrates -- What is philosophy? -- Euthyphro : defining philosophical terms -- The apology, Phaedo, and Crito : the trial, immortality, and death of Socrates -- Philosophy of religion -- Can we prove that God exists? -- St. Anselm : the ontological argument -- St. Thomas Aquinas : the cosmological argument -- William Paley : the teleological argument -- Blaisepascal : it is better to believe in God's existence than to deny it -- William James (...) : free choice is the basis of belief -- Does the idea of a good God exclude evil? -- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz : God can allow some evil -- David Hume : a good God would exclude evil -- Ethics -- Are ethics relative? -- Ruth Benedict : ethics are relative -- W.T. Stace : ethics are not relative -- Are humans always selfish? -- Humans are always selfish : Glaucon's challenge to Socrates -- James Rachels : humans are not always selfish -- Which is basic in ethics : happiness or obligation? -- Aristotle : happiness is living virtuously -- Jeremy Bentham : happiness is seeking the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people -- Immanuel Kant : duty is prior to happiness -- Friedrich Nietzsche : happiness is having power -- Jean-Paul Sartre : existentialist ethics -- Rosemarie Tong : feminist ethics are different -- Contemporary moral problems : abortion, homosexuality, animal rights -- Jane English : are most abortions moral? -- Peter Singer : do animals have rights? -- Knowledge -- What is knowledge? -- Plato : knowledge is warranted, true belief -- What method is best for acquiring knowledge? -- Charles Sanders Peirce : four approaches to philosophy -- How do we acquire knowledge? -- René Descartes : knowledge is not ultimately sense knowledge -- John Locke : knowledge is ultimately sensed -- Immanuel Kant : knowledge is both rational and empirical -- How is truth established? -- Bertrand Russell : truth is established by correspondence -- Francis H. Bradley : truth is established by coherence -- William James : truth is established on pragmatic grounds -- Can we know the nature of causal relations? -- David Hume : cause means regular association -- David Hume : there are no possible grounds for induction -- Metaphysics -- Why is there something rather than nothing? -- Parmenides : being is uncaused -- Lao-Tzu : non-being is the source of being -- Is reality general or particular? -- Plato : universals are real -- David Hume : particulars are real -- Of what does reality consist? -- René Descartes : reality consists of mind and matter -- Paul Churchland : reality consists of matter -- George Berkeley : reality consists of ideas -- John Dewey : reality consists of mental and physical qualities -- Are humans free? -- Holbach : humans are determined -- Robert Kane : humans are free -- Social and political philosophy -- What is liberty? -- Fyodor Dostoevski : liberty and authority -- John Stuart Mill : liberty is independence from the majority's tyranny -- Martin Luther King, Jr. : liberty and racial prejudice -- Which government is best? -- Thomas Hobbes : monarchy is best -- John Locke : democracy is best -- Karl Marx : communism and nonalienated labor is best -- Alexis de Tocqueville : democracy can have serious problems -- Karl Popper : utopias lead to violence -- Aesthetics -- What constitutes the experience of beauty? -- Plotinus : beauty, sensuous, and ideal -- What is the function of art? -- Aristotle : the nature of tragedy -- Henri Bergson : the nature of comedy -- Philosophy and the good life -- Classic views of the good life -- Epicurus : Epicurus and the pleasant life -- Epictetus : Epictetus and the life of self-control -- What gives life meaning? -- Leo Tolstoy : faith provides life's meaning -- Albert Camus : each person determines his or her life's meaning -- What is the value of philosophy? -- Bertrand Russell : the value of philosophy. (shrink)

‘Pragmatism’, even though it names a recognizable movement in philosophy, does not denote a unitary outlook. Nevertheless, the contention that the connection among the diverse Pragmatist philosophers is only methodological is ill-founded. There are substantive features of Pragmatist thought that are characteristic, and one of these is pluralism. My objective in this paper is twofold: first, to review some of the pluralist elements in the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey and, second, to call attention to the work of (...) two seldom discussed Pragmatists in whose writings pluralism is a central motif, John Herman Randall, Jr. and Horace Kallen. I shall be concerned with metaphysical and moral pluralism and also with the empirical and phenomenological pluralism to which both are linked. (shrink)

In management research, theory testing confronts a paradox described by Meehl in which designing studies with greater methodological rigor puts theories at less risk of falsification. This paradox exists because most management theories make predictions that are merely directional, such as stating that two variables will be positively or negatively related. As methodological rigor increases, the probability that an estimated effect will differ from zero likewise increases, and the likelihood of finding support for a directional prediction boils down to a (...) coin toss. This paradox can be resolved by developing theories with greater precision, such that their propositions predict something more meaningful than deviations from zero. This article evaluates the precision of theories in management research, offers guidelines for making theories more precise, and discusses ways to overcome barriers to the pursuit of theoretical precision. (shrink)